“The Perfect Storm” Chapter (IRAQ-4a 2005-2006 Case Study)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BOOK RESOURCE INFORMATION Chapter 13 "The Perfect Storm" - Notes Book: The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama Authors: Michael R Gordon and General Bernard E Trainor* Authors’ Note: Wesley Morgan, a 2011 Princeton graduate, was integral to the writing and research of the book Copyright 2012, March 2013 edition Vintage Books, NY Trainor, Bernard E. - General From Wikipedia *Trainor died June 2, 2018 (aged 89) in Sterling, Virginia, U.S. 1946-United States Marine Corp - enlisted in 1946 1947 - NROTC Naval Reserve Officer Training 1951 - June graduated from college (Jesuit college Holy Cross) BA history and became Marine second lieutenant 1951 - Quantico - December - Quantico, Virginia - The Basic School in Marine Corp 1951 - Korea - infantry platoon commander - 1st Marine DIvision 1953 - USS Columbus - heavy cruiser - two year tour - became captain 1953-1958 Headquarters Marine Corps Personnel Dept. 1958-1959 - British Royal Marine Commandos - exchange officer - After a period of training in the United Kingdom, he commanded a company in 45 Commando, 3 Commando Brigade, on Malta. 1959-Camp Pendleton, California - 1st Marine Division 1961 - NROTC - educator - Colorado - University of Colorado - also MA history - also promoted to major 1960s-Quantico - student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College 1965 July - Vietnam - assigned as an advisor to a Vietnamese special operations group. 1956 or so - After a year in Vietnam, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and returned to Quantico, where he served for three years as an instructor at the Command and Staff College. 1969-1970 Alabama June 1970 completed course, paper on politico-militry thought: attended the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. During his War College course he was awarded the Anderson Memorial Award for the "best paper dealing with politico- military thought" and designated a "Distinguished Graduate" upon completion of the course in June 1970 1970 - Vietnam - 1st Battalion 5th Marines; 1st Recon Battalion of the 1st Marine Division 1971-1972 - Headquarters Marine Corps - promoted to colonel 1974-1975 New York 1st Marine Corps District 1976 Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina. 1978 Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico-deputy for education/director, education center 1981 Plans Headquarters Marine Corps 1983 promoted to lt. general: deputy chief of staff for plans, policies and operations, Headquarters Marine Corps. He served in this capacity until his retirement on July 1, 1985. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS Why these chapters are important 1) brings the novice or layman, as well as the experienced military person, quickly and directly into the early Iraqi/US military war zone 2) brings up key issues and groups that plagued the USA early on and in many cases even to this day (in 2022) 3) shows the nature of Middle Eastern infiltrations in general 4) shows how attention on one front can leave a vacuum or vulnerability on another front 5) shows the severe violence and types of weapons used, the extent of the ruthlessness 6) shows how people among the Iraqis who were supposed to be allies back-stabbed the US or ran their own parallel operations Key points made by the authors: missed opportunities, too much focus to off-ramp and not enough on proper counterinsurgency operations across the board in Iraq, not increasing manpower when needed; -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY OF EACH CHAPTER 10 The Red Team Starts with a discussion of Zalmay Khalizad who in July 2005 became ambassador to Iraq and spurred the Red Team analysis. Two main operations are covered- Syrian border Anbar Qaim (and nearby towns) under McChrystal and Tal Afar under McMaster, which paralleled each other at points in time and operational approach. Several assessments and political leader presentations provide key insights into what the Americans actually knew, ideas about countering the Iraqi terrorists, lost opportunities for proper coalition responses. The Red Team was a small analysis team created to look over the US military operation in Iraq and to identify problems and make recommendations. Casey seems to have tried to obstruct it by discounting it as unnecessary and keeping it from being presented. Its approach was similar in ways to the later officiated 2007 surge. The Endgame’s authors seem to be suggesting that if its recommendations had been properly addressed and followed, it would have possibly have prevented delayed time. A more detailed discussion of the Red Team analysis is presented below. There are several examples throughout this chapter showing beyond the Red Team’s analysis, people made suggestions on how to respond to failures or build on existing successes, and these were ignored by Casey and Abizaid because of the focus on the planned upcoming drawdown. One of them is by Crowe. Another is how a Ramadi disaster and tragedy of recruited locals did not receive American military support with a subsequent push. People were killed in large numbers during that recruitment drive, along with at least two Americans (like Michael McLoughlin) during a suicide vest bombing. Another point is that the Sept. 2005 Tal Afar operation needed more things and troops and there were delays. 82 Airborne was ordered but a change in timing of the start of the battle caused it to shop up after the main thrust was over. They did help with the aftermath base spreading. Assessments: that of The Red Team (title of the chapter); The White Paper; back-reference to earlier 2004 one; Rice’s presentation on hold and build, which was short-sighted because the subsequent presidential address which reflected it used Tal Afar as an example when it was an exception. The Red Team Analysis “Two Rivers Campaign” (see p. 162) Came on a wave of Khalizad’s approach to seek political reconciliation and “break the back” of the insurgency, and to study lessons of other counterinsurgencies pp 160-163 in The Endgame by Gordon and Trainor (see more Book resource details above) Excerpt: The team’s diagnosis of American accomplishments thus far was troubling. The effort to disrupt the insurgents’ planning had not been decisive. The enemy was able to retain freedom of movement and conduct operations. The perception of many Iraqis is that their government, and by implication, the coalition has failed the Iraqi people.” Iraq’s security forces-issues; police-issues; Iraqi government was too political to work for the country as a whole. “The Red Team affirmed that Casey’s strategy was badly off course and had almost no prospect of success. Because little headway was being made against the insurgents and Iraqi forces were still a work in progress, Casey’s timetable for handing power over to the Iraqis simply set them up for failure. If the American military had its hands full coping with the insurgents, how were the Iraqi Army and police to do better? Casey, it seemed, had a plan for taking American troops out of Iraq but not for leaving a stable and democratic country in their wake.” VERY IMPORTANT DEPICTION OF THE IMPLICATIONS - red bold by PF …The report noted that fears of abandonment by the United States might lead the Iraqis to hedge their future by developing greater reliance on Iran. Insurgents, who believed that disengagement and not victory was the American goal, would be less likely to cut the political deals that would be needed to shore up the new Iraq: ‘The perception that disengagement, not victory over the insurgency, is the objective could encourage the insurgents to believe that they have broken the coalition’s will.’ The fragmentation of the country would increase. The American public might question whether a muddled outcome in Iraq had been worth the cost. “If the war on terror is the central conflict of our times and if the conflict in Iraq is the central front in that war, it would be confusing to Americans (both in Iraq and at home) why victory was no the campaign plan’s goal,” the study noted. “Confusion in this regard could lead to disaffection.” Who Was on The Red Team It was comprised of civilian and military leaders. Colonel Bruce Reider, an Army strategist linked to Casey and Marin Strmecki, a conservative defense consultant and a few others 11 The Year of Living Dangerously (Chapter 11, pp 181-203) Summary: starts with a discussion on Lt. General Pete Chiarelli coming back from a stateside break and taking over MNC-1; chapter shows the transistion from Jaafari to Malike as prime minister of Iraq; Chiarelli later in chapter is depicted handling three US military criminal cases-one Marine unit at Haditha which also involved a cover-up and two involving murders and one a rape through the Army 101st Airborne Division; Al-Qaeda kidnapped and tortured three from the rape/murder platoonapparently in retaliation; Iraqi security or national police torture: Jadriya bunker and Site 4; Shiite Samarra city Al-Askari mosque bombing by Al- Qaeda in Feb. 2006; Iraq Ambassador Khalizad’s direct influence of choosing prime minister Maliki and the thought processes that went into it; December 15, 2005 vote and background security like unusual STRATCOM taking action to prevent insurgents and militants taking to internet to disrupt elections;is discussed. Sunni and Shiite attacks on the population and each other are discussed, including Shiite abuse and torture of Sunni detainees, like at Jadriya Bunker in southern Baghdad. Issue around patches and violating the Antideficiency Act issued on July 4, 2004 which prohibits wrongful government expenditures, in this case the purchase of a nonstandard patch to get the head of the horse the right direction to face forward rather than look backward as if it was retreating because of a left/right inversion, costing $60,000 of his divisions’ funds. (It was probably a feeling of a bad omen to wear a patch like that in a dangerous combat zone). US Military units discussed in this chapter 1st Cavalry Division - p. 181 - refers back to 2004, Chiarelli, struggles with Mahdi Army, Chiarelli last there with it in early 2005 V Corps p. 182 headed back to Iraq under Chiarelli, to command that and MNC-Iraq at end of 2005 MNC-Iraq - Chiarelli took charge at end of 2005 STRATCOM - p. 183 General James Cartright commander 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment p. 185 - Arab Jabour area just south of Baghdad 3rd Infantry Division p. 186-deputy commander Horst 1st Infantry Division - p. 190 drawdown deployment cancellation 1st Armored Divsion’s 2nd Brigade, became CENTCOM’s reserve force - p. 190 2006 offramp meant a single brigade would be in charge of Diyala province - p. 190 4th Infantry Division replaced 3rd Infantry Division - p. 190 it had smaller manpower but more tech 4th Brigade, 101st Airborne p. 191 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry DIvision p. 191 JSOC p. 191 Stan McChrystal going after Zarqawi 3/1 Marines p. 200-201 Haditha scandal 101st Airborne scandals-two p. 202: Lake Tharthar- 3rd Brigade/101st Airborne commanded by Colonel Mike Steele; p. 202 1-502/101st Airborne Infantry-Yusifaya area p. 202-203 2-6 Infantry p. 194 Colonel Jim Danna-Operation Scales of Justice-moved up from Kuwait and divvied up; operation saw the introduction of Shiite dominated Interior Ministry troops-operation was in response tothe Samarra mosque bombing in Feb.22 2006 Mentions of Iraqi Abuses, Violence-Abuses intertwine in Shiite controlled spaces as sectarian terrorism against Sunnis “ To the average Sunni, the Iraqi security forces were much more of a persistent threat, particularl because of system collusion between some elements and the Mahdi Army.” p. 203 p. 185 - Wolf Brigade/1st Battalion burning cars, attempting to light houses on fire, and slapping and repeatedly striking detainees p. 185-Police - Badr members had infiltrated the police p. 185- Interior Ministry - Sunnis being abducted and hauled to the 6th and 7th floors for interrogation or worse p. 185 Jadriya Bunker - Engineer Ahmed running off-the-books operation-handcuffed detainees on floor outside office (p. 186); p. 186-large locked room with 12 blindfolded prisoners, men said theys been held for months; in two adjacent rooms Horst found 168 detainees lined up in cramped rows and blindfolded-stench overwhelming-no latrines, prisoners forced to urinate in water bottles and defecate where they could - prisoners began lifting up shirts to show marks of beating and torture, many said occurred in that room, State Dept cable siad more than a hundred showed signs of abuse. Site 4-p. 203 very serious abuses Wolf Brigade Special Police Commandos p. 203 National Police p 203 Interior Ministry (Iraqi government agency) p. 185- while SCIRI ran the ministry, other mostly Shiite political parties, like Dawa and the Adrists, ruled its different floors like fiefdoms Fearing for their safety, some senior officials avoided the elevators and America n adviseres went to the latrine in pairs. Badr Corps p. 185, Iran-based SCIRI p. 185 JAM- Jaish al-Mahdi p. 191 - often referred to as Mahdi Army; p. 195 p. 194 maintained illegal checkpoints, engaged in extra-judicial detention Al Qaeda Zarqawi p. 191 1920 Revolution Brigades p. 192 Jaish-al Islami p. 192 Mujahideen Shura Council p. 192 12 Together Forward (Chapter 12 p. 200) Includes Zarqawi killing; Together Forward 1, re-upped Forward 1-Phase One, and Forward II; MIA two soldiers, subsequent American search and find of their abused bodies Maliki had created Together Forward to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad); Al Qaeda in Iraq Zarqawi killed by group lead by JSOC (special operations, headed by MChrystal); Casey working toward off-ramping; June 16 Together Forward began around this date insurgents ambushed a patrol from 1-502 infantry, killing one soldier and kidnapping two others which triggered a mass response and distracted from Together Forward, three days later bodies were found severely traumatized near the Russian built thermal power plant on banks of Euphrates; Together Forward I started again on July 9 as a new Phase I - a solid discussion on JAM is on p 213; torture discussed on p 214; bodies piling up in a soccer field made into a graveyard; Casey asked to extend tour another year p 216, Together Forward II Aug 7 p 218. 13 The Perfect Storm Summary and More Detail Summary: The Perfect Storm Of particular importance in this chapter is the discussion of the Shiite early infiltration of the Baghdad Airport The Perfect Storm chapter shows: Buildup to 2007 Surge Continued discussion of Togther Forward II Infiltrations Nature of Iraqi, Islamic, Shiite, Sunni Infiltrations Infiltrations in General o What can happen to airports o Ministries (government agencies) o How American propped foreign governments might be working with the enemy (like Iran) Airports - importance of Detention Centers without proper oversight, the enemy trained, planned and built up Multiple fronts: Insurgency against US presence and also simultaneous sectarian civil warfare Early stages of a Shiite takeover problem that has plagued Iraq ever since, with players then still around today The problems the Americans had trying to work alongside the Iraqi National Police, certain commando groups, and certain Iraqi army divisions This chapter and the three preceding it listed in this section is a buildup to the Surge coming up in 2007. It shows what the Americans were dealing with in Iraq - how bad things were by 2005 and 2006, after only two or three years after the American invasion which topped Saddam Hussein’s regime . It gives a strong accounting of both Shiite and Sunni threats. This chapter gives a good accounting of Shiite threats that were primarily in Sadr City in Baghdad’s northeast corner and its militia, the Mahdi Army. Other Shiite strongholds also existed in key areas throughout Iraq. Sunni threats involved multifold retaliations by various Sunnis to Shiite aggressions as well as increasingly organized Al Qaeda in Iraq. Sunni were more in the belts around Baghdad (with exceptions) and out west in the large Anbar Province. Infiltrations occurred in the Iraqi Ministries and National Police by Shiite militias with very violent results to many Sunnis. Two assessments teams are discussed in the chapter. In addition, a discussion of ongoing American intelligence showing they already knew a lot about their enemies. One intelligence trove was the Taji DOCEX. The first assessment was a task force to study extra-judicial killings by Major David Hansen, an intelligence officer. The second assessment was by a team of women leaders lead by Lt. Col. Nycki Brooks. She added to a 2004 assignment period when she first started to learn about Saddam Hussein’s earlier approach to belts, rings or corridors around Baghdad as strategic activity, supply channels and human entry points into Baghdad. The concept of identifying and targeting such strategic areas becomes a significant core of the developing surge. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- More Detail: The Perfect Storm What does a perfect storm mean? The idea behind the name of this chapter shows up at the end and is linked to something Chiarelli said to Brooks and is the name of an assessment paper by Brooks reflecting their discussion and his request she write a paper. “Chiarelli was taken aback by Brooks’s assessment. The situation she was describing… sounded like “the perfect storm.” (p. 239) Definition Perfect storm A "perfect storm" is an expression that describes an event where a rare combination of circumstances will aggravate a situation drastically. The term is also used to describe an actual phenomenon that happens to occur in such a confluence, resulting in an event of unusual magnitude. What does perfect storm mean? - definitions www.definitions.net/definition/perfect+storm By 2005 and 2006, the US already knew a lot about the Baghdad area problems, although there were missing pieces throughout other parts of Iraq. They knew significant things about Shiite Mahdi Army infiltrations and also Sunni-Al Qaeda tactics. The tragic thing is, they knew Baghdad International Airport was already gone - in the hands of Shiites, namely the Sadrists and their Mahdi militia arm. The Americans were not prepared to tackle that problem, but continued to do street patrols in Baghdad. "Sadrist control of the Transportation Ministry - and, by extension, Baghdad International Airport, which it oversaw, was on of the American intelligence's deepest secrets. The American military did not want the Sadrists to know how much the US had figured out about their operations until they were prepared to move against them, which in 2006 the Americans were not." (p 220) "As for air travel the Sadrists appeared to control every facet." (p 221) Takeaways/Lines of Continuity: we can seek such in the way airports were not handled properly in the Afghanistan pull-out of 2021 under the Biden/Harris administration. Many military and strategic experts are horrified by the lack of professionalism and control in the way the two main airports were not handled right in evacuating Americans and certain key Afghans. In general, we need to look at how our military handles overseas conflict zone airports in terms of maintaining control, security and effectiveness. We also need to look at how airports become infiltrated and why we don't do anything to stop this or regain control once it happens. Operatives: Waeli was bad news: head of two key organizations - under Jaffari put in charge of National Security Affairs, something Jafarri wanted control of; under Maliki, Ministry of Transportation minister. Waeli was a major snitch. He also was going to Tehran and talking to Iranian leaders. Americans having to deal with difficult, corrupt, violent and sectarian Iraqis who were supposed to be part of the military, police and government meant to help create a more democrative Iraq. The Shiites were infiltrating many things and running operations against Sunnis. This put our American leaders in very difficult situations. When the Shiites attacked Sunnis from places like the National Police, Sunnis would attack the National Police, even after the Americans pulled the old National Police out and tried to replace them with a better Iraqi leader (p226). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Syria Of significance in chapter because it shows already present connections by Al Qaeda in Iraq to Al Qaeda in Syria, with Saddam Hussein’s previous regime’s secular Baathists involved -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Islamic State (p230) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assessments, Intelligence, Task Force Hansen-Extrajudicial killings Brooks- paper “The Perfect Storm” (p 239) Taji DOCEX (p 233) in December Report seized in December (p 231) but written early in fall. It is not immediately clear if this is from the overall Taji Docex. p. 233 a 27 year old Al-Qaeda member interrogated at Camp Cropper described the workings of a car bomb cell under Abu Ghazwan’s overall command. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Objective Royal Oak in desert between Taji and Lake Tharthar. Daylight mission Nov. 27, team of JSOC commandos (p 235) This was an intense operation. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Detention Camps (p 231) “Even captured insurgents continued to cause problems. Inside Camp Bucca, the largest American detention facility since Abu Ghraib had been closed, there was an Al-Qaeda cell that taught prisoners classes in Islamic law, operational security, and basic counterinterrogation tactics.” p. 233 “During his nearly two years in detention, Mazin had benefited from the extensive network of Al-Qaeda operatives who made use of their time in Bucca to train new recruits, taking classes inside the prison on religious law and on building bombs. ‘Mazin entered Camp Bucca as an ingnorant donkey,’ but applied what he learned quickly after connecting with a senior bomb maker named Abu Nur (p 234) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Belts Discussed in some detail in The Perfect Storm chapter and other chapters - important There is a brief but useful discussion of the location of key belt areas in The Perfect Storm. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Weapons discussed in The Perfect Storm chapter (mostly applies to what enemy combatants used) VBIEDs p 231 IEDs p 231 Chemical weapons p231 dabbling unsuccessfully in chemical weapons trying to incorporate chlorine canisters from abandoned weapons and in one case from teh water treatment plant that supplied much of Baghdad into car and truck bombs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Agencies in The Perfect Storm , BUSINESSES, GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY DIVISIONS Ministries Transportation Baghdad International Airport - Transportation Ministry Oversaw this Health Facilities Protection Service, consisted of 150 guards and functioned as a private militia. Ministry had used ambulances and personnel to move weapons around city and carry out killings and kidnappings. Interior: National Police were under the Interior Ministry (p 224) Higher Education Ministry (p 227) Militias-Shiite Jaysh al-Mahdi; Mahdi Army - the Sadrists' militia arm, dominant security force in Sadr City (p 220) Ministry of State for National Security Affairs created by al-Jaafari, rivaled CIA-backed Iraqi National Intelligence Services. Global Risk Strategies (p222) A to Z Cleaning Company, p 221 National Police (Iraqi); p 224 Al Qaeda in Iraq (p 229) ferocious campaign of car and truck bombings had helped ignite a civil war between Sunni and Shiite Iraqis Mujahideen Shura Council (p 229) Islamic State of Iraq (p 230) Bayji Oil Refinery ( p 231) Badr Corps (p 231) Dawa Party (p 231) SCIRI the Hakims’ political party (p 237) Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard (Hussein era) (p 237) DIA (p 231) DIA report on Al-Qaeda financial strength Jaish-al Islami (p 233) two units agreed to switch their banner to Al-Qaeda en masse ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Locations in The Perfect Storm Cities Baghdad Areas in Baghdad Sadr City Huda School in Tarmiya (p 233) Camp Taji (p 233) Karkh Water Treatment Plant (p 233) Tigris (p 233) Camp Bucca (p 231) Tarmiyah (p 233) Camp Cropper (p 233) Taji (p 235) Arab Jabour (p 235) Salman Pak (p235) Lake Tharthar (p 235) Saab al-Bor (p237) Diyala Province (p 236) IMPLICATIONS “The Perfect Storm” Chapter in book Endgame - Implications This was mentioned before, has been worked on internally and informally in a preparatory way, now being notated. One of the main points is how an Iraq airport became quickly infiltrated very near to the main high security American military HQ (almost right next door); how there might be implications to the recent Afghan pullout ordeal as it relates to two airports (what are the Americans doing wrong about airport security in war zone sites)- one a more military one and one more civilian, and how stateside American airports might be infiltrated in a similar manner. The other point to focus on in the chapter is how Iraqi government “ministries”- similar to American government agencies and departments - were rapidly infiltrated - for example, not only transportation and the main airport, but also health. The other point is about infiltrations in general, how human networks operate culturally, strategically and operationally in general and in particular. In terms of the particular, the chapter looks at how two main groups of Islamic networks operated in 2005-2006 - Shiite and Sunni. In terms of the general or broader implications, we can then ask and how this might relate to Hispanic cartel and gang networking, like takeovers of American medical facilities, health insurance, cell phones, internet and shopping centers. We also need to look at why Americans had a good deal of critical military intelligence in Iraq in 2005-2006, but did not act on what they knew when it came to the Baghdad airport as well as certain key leaders and snitches among the Shiite-Mahdi Army-Iranian leadership connections. The point to be made here is we can know a lot, but are we applying what we know? How do we miss critical opportunities? INFRASTRUCTURE and how insurgencies can cause problems WATER, HEAT, SANITATION, ELECTRICITY also see govt reg. depts AIRPORTS What can happen to airports DETENTION Detention Centers What can happen inside detention centers o illicit training and planning, organizing MORGUES AND BURIAL SITES Where dead bodies might go in crisis areas fields morgue pileups sometimes left on streets, dogs can get to them found in rivers - water public health risk ACCESS WAYS Access Ways to Main Life Necessities Roads can be blocked, controlled, bombed, checkpoints Bridges Location to belts, highway GOVERNMENT REGULATING DEPARTMENTS also known as Agencies, Ministries Health - infiltrated prevents help/harms targeted groups Interior-National Police-infiltrated attack targeted groups Transportation-infiltrated-airport, planes, seaport, INSURGENCY OPPOSITIONAL MULTI-GROUP PRESENCE Simultaneous violently competing and acting human/weaponry variables Insurgency against US presence and also simultaneous sectarian civil warfare against each other. This is largely what was referred to as “the perfect storm” here, played off of something Chiarelli said and applied to an analuysis report Sunnis o Al Qaeda was trying to incite civil war between Shiites and Sunnis o Rejectionists were ex-Saddam people, including many Baathists, who felt (and were) left out in the cold o Foreign fighters coming from or via adjacent Syria and elsewhere o Car bombers, Suicide bombers Al Qaeda made car bombs in safe houses in belts around Baghdad o Sunni retaliation against Shiite attacks were often brutal o Some Sunni tribal groups after fighting Americans later decided to cooperate against Al Qaeda Anbar-Sunni Awakening Shiites o Shiites had major players inside Iraq Mahdi Army - aka JAM northeastern Baghdad major spiritual leader other Shiite sects o Shiite attacks against Sunnis were often quite brutal Kurds o although generally more cooperative with the Americans, had a clashing side o How we can apply the contents of this chapter to various issues From Personal Notes section Jan 2022 o Further Applications, Later or Concurrent Issues Related to these topics Keep Airports, Detention Centers, Medical Facilities, Main Access Roadways, Water Ways and Water Purification Centers, Sewage and Sanitation at top-of-mind awareness during crises and high event times, as well as in clear- hold-build times Is someone trying to incite civil war between Republicans and Democrats? o Later Information on some people in this section ----------------------------------------- Updates 2022/02/19; 2022/02/18; 2022/02/16; 2022/02/14 The Red Team-additions; 2022/02/11 added Summary and Detail section for The PErfect Storm under the list SUmmaries of Each Chapter - thereby moving most of it from an earlier just Perfect Storm section,b ecause this overall page started out as a review of The Perfect Storm only - later I decided to incorpoate and include the three earlier chapters before it because they provide a more complete discussion of the buildup of the subject, including the subsequent 2007 Surge;2022/02/09 added chapter summary on The REd Team and the Year of Living Dangerously, some of it had been on the Names section and moved here; 2022/01/09 adding links to index; 2022/01/07 added comments 2022/01/05 from Pernal Notes section;2022/01/06 PAGE STARTED--raw-4 The Perfect Storm given its own page, moved from Iraq-1
Book Resource Information o Trainor, Bernard E (General) Iraq-4b Names in Chapters 10-13 - Case Study (separate page) Overview of the Chapters Summary of each Chapter o 10 The Red Team (Chapter 10, pp. 158-179) o 11 The Year of Living Dangerously (Chapter 11, pp. 180-203) Summary US military units Iraqi abuses abuses Interior Ministry o 12 Together Forward ( Chapter 12, pp. 204-219 ) o 13 The Perfect Storm (Ch 13, pp. 220-239 Summary, More Detail) What does The Perfect Storm mean here? Syria Islamic State Assessments, Intelligence, Task Forces Detention Camps Belts Weapons Locations Agencies Ministries Implications of The Perfect Storm and other chapters Comments - Applications o Why this chapter is so important Buildup to 2007 Surge Infiltrations Nature of Iraqi, Islamic, Shiite, Sunni Infiltrations Infiltrations in General o Important War Zone/Insurgency Subjects applicable across time and space Infrastructure Insurgency - Oppositional Multigroup Presence
Resources and Input Policing, Borders, Drugs, Cartels and System Corruption
IRAQ SECTION Brief 1 General Information o 1a-Terminology o b-Operations o c-Battles, Encounters, incidents 2-Invasion 3-Pre-2003 4 2005-2006 Case Study o 4a-Perfect Storm o 4b Names 5-Links More Detail 1 General Information o 1a-Terminology o b-Operations o c-Battles, Encounters, incidents Iraq-2 5-Troop Misconduct 6-Iran-Iraq-USA 7-Injuries (also Veterans Issues) 8-Deaths 9-United Kingdom Involvement Iraq, other allies (Afghanistan and Iraq) 10-Some mentioned divisions 11-Some mentioned names 12-Iraq after Op End. Freedom 13- Very brief history of Iraq 14-Iraq War Contractors 15-Other Allies of the USA in Iraq - OIF Iraq-3 Iraq-4a Case Study “Perfect Storm” Iraq-4b Iraq-5-Links See also Incidents/Deaths US Combat Zones Iraq, etc Taps-1a Memorial Taps-1b Articles Islamic Resources Islamofascism Road Bombs
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