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War Zone Iraq 2006-2009 Applications to BLM (RRT-13-Case Study)

cont. START HERE CFR dot org https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war [PF Note: this has a brief visual timeline that is both good for new learners and as a review for some with a little more background. Some parts seem to be contested by other sources, like the first Samarra mosque bombing setting off waves of sectarian battles. Some suggest such were expected but it was relatively quiet. Also, this expression “He [Maliki in Apr 2006] forms a unity government with Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis: does not adequately portray the Iraq government situation in 2006.] ASSESSMENT Takeovers and Losing Control in Iraq: How to Recognize Similar Signs in USA and Do Something About it to Turn it Around One important chapter in these matters is Chapter 19 “the Enemy Within” (Endgame) in which once again in the book we are given strong indications good quality committees were in fact set up to review the situation and make practical suggestions. What we can learn and apply from this is that the Americans and their Allies do in fact know what is wrong, but there is a disconnect in applying it in planning and in stopping the takeovers. Key Concepts: • Put out fires at onset so you are not backed into a corner later with limited options • Multiple antagonists in-country can create a “perfect storm” • Prioritizing Fronts/High Intensity Areas can result from having multiple antagonists multiple places; limited funds, human and weaponry/technical assets; low political support; uninspired leadership; ignorance at the beginning • Unprotected borders • Insufficient control of antagonist leaders in-country • Insufficient awareness of how antagonists network to take over locations and operations • Foreign plus Citizen antagonists: how different, how interconnected • Get good at breaking up gigs Bad Foreign-Originated Leaders Linked to US Processes Some Key Concepts: If it smells and pricks like a thorn, it likely is one One of our questions should be: Could this guy come back to haunt us? Names of those applicable to this discussion • Maliki Nouri al-Maliki - Nouri Kamil Muhammad-Hasan al-Maliki Iraq prime minister 2006-2014 as American-sponsored Iraqi Leader after ousting Saddam Hussein •The episode opened a window into Maliki’s machinations his efforts to build up his credentials with the Sadrists (see below), and the challenges of shaping politics in Iraq. A bedrock principle of counterinsurgency was persuasion of militias to put down their arms and join the political system - essentially diminishing the number of irreconcilables detrmined to fight to the end. But the case of Qais al-Khazli showed that, in his political struggle with Sadr, Maliki was tempted to reconcile with factions that were actively kidnapping and executing Americans.” (p. 354). [PF Note: Red added for emphasis. Some people closely tied to putting Maliki in power: Michael Douglas Barbero, Khalizad; Maliki was sworn in on May 20, 2006; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki • Zarqawi Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-Iraq’s Al Qaeda leader after US 2003 invasion • Sistani Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani • Khalizad Zalmay Khalizad seems suspicious • Sadr Application(s) involving Leaders Inside USA Foreign-Originated Legislative and other leaders in US are showing signs of complicity with radical Muslim and leftists. Ethnically oriented Legislators and other leaders (like governors and Attorney Generals) are doing the same. Planned Organizers/Operatives Iran’s Quds Force. Applications involving Operatives Black Lives Matter La Raza Communists Socialists Jewish Holocaust Revenge Movement Sadrists The Sadrist Movement named after prominent clerics from the al-Sadr family – emerged in Iraq in the 1990s amid the Shia Muslim uprising against President Saddam Hussein after his defeat in the Gulf War. A product of decades of suppression of the Shia population under the Sunni-led Baath Party, the revolt was violently crushed by Saddam. The US invasion of 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam resulted in the formation of the anti-US Mahdi Army, the Sadrist Movement’s militia wing. The Sadrists, however, set violence aside when they participated in the general election of 2005 as part of a wider coalition of Shia parties. The Mahdi Army was disbanded in 2008, only to be revived as the Peace Companies around 2014 to fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Sunni militant jihadist group. Since 2003, the Sadrist Movement – in its militant and political incarnations – has been led by Muqtada al-Sadr, whose persona and public statements are often imbued with messianism and millenarianism. https://censamm.org/resources/profiles/sadrist-movement See Reuters below MULTIPLE ATTACKS (Whether Coordinated Simultaneously or Not) • Suicide Bombings • Coordinated Riots LONG-TERM PLAYERS Maliki Al-Sadr Several key Clerics Applications: One of our questions should be: Could this guy come back to haunt us? Some of the above were listed as “trouble” early on, but even when caught or could otherwise have been grabbed, managed to get out of US hands only to cause trouble later for many years. Reuters 2021/06/29 In Iraq, an old U.S. foe grows his political power https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/iraq-cleric/ The political movement of nationalist hi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has quietly come to dominate the apparatus of the Iraqi state. This could pose problems for the United States and Iran. By JOHN DAVISON and AHMED RASHEED in BAGHDAD Filed June 29, 2021, 11 a.m. GMT BORDERS 2005-General Casey decided to do a mini-surge at the Syria-Iraq border, feeling leaks there were allowing terrorists and their supplies to enter the country. He knew the Baghdad area also had serious problems, part of which was suicide bombers. He placed US manpower and weaponry along two western border main fronts - both were road and trade routes following the country’s two main rivers. Some terrorist rat’s nests were in these border towns. Applications: • Given two or more high intensity areas, having to prioritize; more to one takes from the other • US borders experiencing planned hybrid warfare and incidental immigrant surges with intentional US leadership malfeasance and likely also incidental negligence or inadequacy (in 2023 and before) • Focused, planned military American responses coupled with diligence have in fact been proven to be effective in Iraq’s border problems; some US leaders are asking for military intervention at US borders now GIGS Get as good at breaking up human gigs as Ordinance Teams find and break up IEDs and EFPs -ideas: corporate antitrust; real deal oversight boards; closing down businesses hiring a lot of illegal immigrants; military intervention at US-Mexico border and in sanctuary cities stop DACA; use and live motto Deport Don’t Transport; cut off funding to sanctuary cities; if FBI is compromised and using operatives at Jan 6 riots along with planted photographers we need to know it. Iran might have been bringing in Iranians to help resettle Iraq and could be among those using hybrid warfare against USA. How do Muslims co-opt an area? Legislation against gangs in department stores.

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH! Stop Racism, Reverse-Racism, Civil Rights as Warfare • Summary • Start Here • Assessment o Leaders there & US ▪ Names Applicable o Applications ▪ Old Thorns Keep Growing ▪ Multiple Attacks ▪ Borders ▪ Gigs • Resources • Links List SUMMARY Some important points to consider on the earlier Iraq-US war zone, 2006-09, is that a variety of issues were involved. Iran was interfering. It was not only supporting fellow Shiites in Iraq, the largest Muslim faction there, but at times they actually also funded Al Qaeda in Iraq, a group involved in sectarian wars against the same Shiites Iran usually supported. Al Qaeda was a major attacking force taking over large parts of Iraq. It was a mixture of Iraqi and foreign types, including terrorists and thugs, but was at least marginally Sunni. They tended to dominate largely in the Anbar region in the western sphere of Iraq, gathering up Sunni alliances through Muslim-style influence or murderous bullying. A serious Shiite threat in the country were the Sadrists and their linked Mahdi Army, as well as a long-term and well known Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Americans at key moments felt stymied until Sistani gave his support or backed off from dissent. He was always in the background as a mover who kept a serious eye on the Iraqi government. . The Sadrists held territory in a city slum area in northwestern Baghdad, the largest city in Iraq. The Sadrists were under a charismatic leader whose father used to be a prominent cleric.

Sources The Endgame. The Inside Story of the Story of Iraq. 2012. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor. Vintage (div. of Random House), NY. US Study Commissions on Iraq Endgame. Chapter 10, “The Red Team”, pp 158-163. Red Team was realistic but Gen. Casey fought it. An effort to quietly fire up US and British leaders failed. Endgame. Iraq Study Group-Jim Banker and Lee Hamilton Chapter 15 “Some Friendly Advice” Endgame. JSAT Chapter 19 “The Enemy Within:pp 354-366. Comes with Petraeus in 2007 Surge early planning. The JSAT was realistic but ultimately its ideas were diluted One problem was OCINC. Endgame. Joint Campaign Plan, p. 363, Petraeus and Crocker. JSAT Review was its foundation. This is where the JSAT plan was “toned down. significantly” Charlie Allen’s critical assessment in 2004 Links List https //www cfr org/timeline/iraq- war https://www.reuters.com/investiga tes/special-report/iraq-cleric/ https //en wikipedia org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki

Shiites had rapidly taken over the Iraqi government and its ministries, aided by the US unwittingly in their putting Maliki in the head position as prime minister. He kept supporting Shiites against Sunnis and Baathists, and was secretive and evasive with the Americans starting early on. He set up Iraqi divisions and spurred raids without US input or knowledge. As a Dawa, he had opposed and been abused by Saddam’s old Baathist types and he was afraid of any hint of their lingering power. He had found asylum from Saddam outside of Iraq and kept ties with Iran. Americans saw indications he was targeting and not including Baathists and Sunni in the developing Iraqi government. Although the Dawa most certainly received unfair and brutal treatment under Saddam Hussein, Maliki* was showing every sign of authoritarian actions himself. Certain Iraqi police units were known to be particularly brutal. This study looks at how states of co-opting in Iraq can look like what is going on in the USA, especially as it relates to BLM. This includes synchronized riots and takeovers of police and ministries. Some of this is already covered in the Iraq section. One of the resulting tragedies of this Iraqi-US nexus was that a variety of ranks and job duty positions of otherwise honest and well- intended “normal” American military personnel were put in compromising situations which ate away at their better first instincts, overall integrity and honor. In training Iraqis in an effort to be able to leave democratic-style ways with locals for the job of running and protecting Iraq when they left later, things kept going off-course and counter-stream, although a few were convinced and stayed loyal to the western approach.